They better not build that mosque down by Ground Zero, we’re being told, not just because it’s insensitive, but because we have no idea what they’ll be up to down there.
I mean, where did the money come from?
Who does this Imam hang out with, anyway?
And, at a time when our Nation faces more threats than ever, why would we let these Muslim madmen situate their “terror command posts” anywhere?
Well, I don’t know about all of that...but I do know a place where lots of these Islamic terrorists go to obtain the equipment and supplies they need to support their particular craft, and I decided to make a bit of an undercover visit to the spot, so that I might “observe and report” on what goes on at this specific location.
So put on your dark glasses...and let’s go see what we can find out.
I can’t give away too many details, for security reasons, but I can tell you that this particular distribution center is located about three miles from the Boeing Company’s Renton, Washington, manufacturing site. (The assembly lines for the 737 family of aircraft and the US Navy’s P-8A Poseidon antisubmarine patrol aircraft are all located on the property.)
Off to the southwest of the Boeing plant are dozens of nondescript commercial buildings, all one or two stories tall—including some that store, produce, or process components and subassemblies that will eventually make their way over to that Boeing plant.
We approach the unmarked building that interests us from the west, and even as we enter the parking lot we can see the terrorists gathering and going up the ramp to get inside—and it’s already clear that one of the warnings I was given has already come to pass: they’re operating under deep cover.
I didn’t let their cover fool me, though: it only takes a quick glance to know these are hardened veterans of jihad, and before I went in, I made sure I had taken every precaution.
You can see terrorists coming out of the building with large sacks of what I can only assume must be ammonium nitrate; to protect their cover they’re carrying the bags in what look like ordinary shopping carts.
I could see that everyone who enters grabbed one of these carts first, presumably as a signal to the guards (who are hidden from view as I enter) that they belong there; I grab one of them as well and pass through the portals to the inner sanctum.
Once inside I can see that there’s no further pretense of trying to hide their presence; terrorists are everywhere, in costume, wandering about freely...and for the moment, at least, they seem unperturbed by my presence.
The effort to maintain a cover story, however, even continues inside, as terrorist “sleeper cells” group up in what look like ordinary families, with a male and female, often accompanied by “terror children” and the occasional older terrorist “mentor”, who were apparently disguised to look like grandparents.
As I went inside the gathering of terrorist supplies continued, even in my presence—and it was amazing to see how effectively even ordinary looking objects could be “reinvented” as tools of terror.
At least 1/3 of the facility is devoted to devices that appear to resemble ordinary produce but have obviously been repurposed for terrorist purposes; in that area I saw terror tomatoes, terror shallots, and even terrorist-enhanced pineapples openly on display...and the costumed devils who had come to this location were grabbing them up as if they were...well, pineapples.
“Terror Tea” is evidently required if you hope to overthrow the infidels, and at least 20 different varieties of what must have been explosive materials (some of it was actually described as “gunpowder tea”) were on display, some in tiny bags small enough to smuggle on aircraft; other “bulk” packages were as large as 400 grams.
For those who seek to formulate their own materials, there is an entire “island” in the center of the store covered with bags of various powders that can be mixed together to achieve various effects; to maintain cover these were also innocently labeled as though they were exotic spices, unknown on this continent. I saw “turmeric”, “fenugreek”, and “cardamom” among the nonsense names that are obviously being used to throw off the English speaker.
They had strange fuels available as well, including “cooking” oil that they claimed was made from the seeds of grapes and some sort of what I assume was liquid explosive that was labeled “ghee”.
All sorts of “canned goods” and bizarre objects in jars were available, obviously intended to allow terrorists to infiltrate decent American homes and plant “booby traps”...but just as Japanese clothing designers seem to have trouble getting the English just right, there were subtle differences that can be observed by a real American.
For example, the word “ZerGüt”, which would never be used on an American product, appears on many of the jars (I couldn’t confirm this on the scene, for reasons of personal safety, but I assume ZerGüt means “Die, haters of Islam!” in Arabic).
Those large bags: they were stacked around the building, and as I approached some of them I saw even more patently ridiculous English labels, clearly intended to throw off Customs and Border Protection inspectors, such as “Brown Jasmine Rice” and “Red Cargo Rice”...and based on how much inventory they had on hand, there’s no doubt that the ruse was working.
The most insidious part of the story I saved for last: the use of cookies and candies as a mechanism for distributing certain unknown pastes that were concealed inside the cookies and candies, and the fact that this type of weapon is especially targeted toward American children.
You could see it from 50 feet away, as the “children” of the sleeper cells would gather around the cases of weapons, often choosing the most brightly colored packaging in what must have been a tactical decision to use that packaging to attract other children later when the cookies are handed out to innocent victims.
Mind control pastes?
Novel explosives?
A means to bankrupt us by spreading diabetes?
It’s impossible to say, but whatever their plot is, it must be diabolical to use such weapons as these.
In an effort to determine exactly what was going on, I obtained several of these packages of weapons. Disassembly and sampling have not enabled me to fully discern exactly what properties these unknown pastes might exhibit, but I do know that they contain high levels of sugar, which could be helpful if you’re looking to make “formed explosives”.
Due to the variety of hues encountered when examining the pastes, I assume there is some sort of color code that I have not yet figured out.
Obviously, I’ll continue to sample the various packages obtained until the scientific data within is more fully revealed.
Despite the fact that I was not dressed as the others in attendance were, I was moved through the money-changing process efficiently, in English (that’s how good they are...), and I was able to return to my vehicle and leave the area without being tailed.
An analysis for active and passive sensing and sending devices (on my vehicle and among the objects obtained) seems to offer no new data compared to a baseline analysis I conducted before visiting this site, so I’m fairly confident I escaped without the potential for future incident...which means the biggest issue remaining is probably assuring the safe disposal of the samples that were collected; as we’ve noted, that process is already underway.
So what did we learn?
We now know that an active distribution network exists to put various booby-trap weapons and other devices in the hands of terrorists—and we know that this activity is occurring within just a few miles of a commercial aircraft assembly facility that also does work for the militaries of this Nation and several others.
The devices are astounding in their similarity to actual items that might be seen in American households...and the terrorists are so good at maintaining cover that, in my presence, they kept themselves in the characters they were taught by their handlers, even to the point of the “children” keeping up the appearance of sticking with their “parents”.
But the most important thing we learned is that we can not take any chances on allowing these terrorists to gain any more footholds in our Homeland.
We don’t know what their diabolical plan is, but we have to act now to stop any further command centers from coming on-line—and most importantly of all, we have to make sure that these terrorists don’t get a chance to take their sleeper cells to a “Community Center” anywhere near Ground Zero, where they might try to play Terror Basketball or cook up “recipes” in a Terror Kitchen...and if we have to throw out the Constitution to make that happen, well, what’s more important, being free, or being safe from being free?
Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Terrorism. Show all posts
Sunday, August 22, 2010
Friday, January 8, 2010
On Pots And Kettles, Or, Peter King: Tool Of Terrorism, Victim Of Irony
As a result of a recent event involving an aircraft and underpants Representative Peter King (R-Not From Iowa), the senior Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee, has again come forth to bring his expertise on questions of international terrorism to the national debate.
King, a Congressman who represents a district that straddles New York’s Long Island (NY-3), previously served as the Comptroller of Nassau County and a member of Hempstead, New York’s Town Council, which wouldn’t seem to be the kind of résumé that would give you much credibility in this arena—but Mr. King is a special case.
You see, Mr. King knows a great deal about terrorism...from the inside...because for many years the personal cause that drove his life was to be an active and public supporter of a terrorist group.
And that’s why, today, we’ll be connecting the dots between Congressman King and the Irish Republican Army.
When King says don’t treat them like an ordinary criminal, what he really means is that he supports a variety of interrogation methods for those who might be terrorists. In fact, in an interview with “Politico” last August King took offense to the very idea that Attorney General Holder would even investigate CIA interrogation practices:
In the same interview King defended the practice of threatening the family of those being interrogated as well as the use of a power drill as a tool of coercion, both practices that qualify as torture under US law:
He’s so fervent about stopping terrorism that, in a 2001 WABC interview, King even offered his support for the use of tactical nuclear weapons against terrorists.
And just the other day, he wondered why a terror suspect would even be allowed to fly at all.
With all due respect, Congressman...they allow you to fly, don’t they?
The (mostly Catholic) Irish Republican Army (and its political wing, Sinn Féin) has been seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the rest of Ireland for nearly a century. This has been challenged by the (mostly Protestant) Ulster Volunteer Force, who want to continue Northern Ireland’s status as a separate entity within the United Kingdom.
It is reported that the IRA killed more than 2000 people from 1972 to 2002 (in fact, they apologized for those killings); the British Army response includes the events that were the inspiration for the U2 song “Sunday Bloody Sunday”.
Among the most famous of the IRA’s terror attacks was a 1974 bombing targeting the House of Commons in London and the assassination of Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin, in 1979.
Americans have been among the victims of IRA bombings; the recently departed Bush Administration made a deal for compensation for some of those victims.
The IRA had a foreign policy, as well, including a relationship with Libya’s Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi that was well underway as early as 1973, involving, at a minimum, the illegal importation of weapons and Semtex explosive into Ireland.
Americans played a major part in the fundraising support for the IRA’s campaign of terror—and prominent among those Americans...was...wait for it...(not yet a Congressman) Peter King, who, ironically, had his telephone calls monitored due to his status as a terrorist sympathizer by the same intelligence establishment he now oversees in his Congressional capacity.
How sympathetic was King? Consider this comment, from a 1982 speech King gave at pro-IRA rally in Nassau County, New York:
(Now Congressman) King was on the dais for the 28th Annual Irish Northern Aid Testimonial Dinner in 1999 (NORAID being the IRA’s US fundraising arm). In 2005 the Bush Administration ordered such fundraising stopped; this because the IRA, in the Administration’s view, was still involved in criminal activity in Ireland.
According to Federal Election Commission records NORAID’s publicity director, attorney Martin Galvin, has only contributed to one Federal political campaign from 1979 to 2008—Peter King’s. This is the same Martin Galvin that reportedly supported the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, which was eventually designated by the US State Department as a “foreign terrorist organization”.
NORAID gave back to King as well. In 1985 they arranged for King to be named Grand Marshal of the St. Patrick’s Day Parade—which, in New York City, is about as big a deal as a politician could ever hope for.
King is also reported to have frequented a Belfast bar known as an IRA hangout, the Felons Club.
An Irish judge once refused to allow King to attend a trial for an IRA member because the judge felt King “...was an obvious collaborator with the IRA."
By the way, this is the same Peter King that once told John McCain he:
(Remember William Ayers? He’s the terrorist that Sarah Palin wanted everyone to know Obama was “palling around with” during the 2008 campaign.)
The American fundraising was driving the political leadership in the UK to fits, including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who, according to notes taken by her staff in 1979, felt that:
So at this point I could end the story by yelling: “Hypocrite, hypocrite, big stinky-butt hypocrite!”...or by suggesting we get all Cheney on the guy and waterboard him to see what other IRA plots he may still be aware of...but the fact is, the picture is a lot more complex than what’s been presented up to this point.
There is reporting that suggests King was willing to meet with representatives of both Sinn Féin and the opposition Ulster Unionist movement, and that his efforts not only helped the Irish peace process, but came at considerable personal risk.
He was also closely associated with Bill Clinton’s efforts to promote peace in Ireland, an unusual partnership for a Republican Congressman and a serving Democratic President in the “modern era” of post-Watergate politics.
And it wasn’t just King—Teddy Kennedy, Alfonse D’Amato, and [insert the name of virtually any “downstate” New York politician here] were working the same rallies and knew some or all of the same people King knew—and were hoping to harvest from the same community of voters and donors and volunteers.
And that’s how we get to the great irony of today’s story:
There is one man in American Government who has literally “palled around” with terrorists—in their own bar, back home in Belfast—and he wasn’t content to just pal around with the terrorists, he went further and actually helped the terrorists fundraise on US soil...for years...despite the fact that the terrorists were also attacking Americans.
And if that wasn’t enough, he kicked it up a notch and palled around with two opposing groups of terrorists, and in doing so, actually made the world a better place.
And yet, in today’s Republiteabag Party Express© environment, when he might be able to apply some of that Irish experience to this conflict, he can’t...which is too bad, because if he did something big, bipartisan, and statesmanlike, right now, it might give him the best shot he’ll ever have at becoming a Senator...in a time when Republiteabaggers badly need a few seats.
In fact, if he was able to tell his own Party this story, it might be the best thing he could do to get more than one new Senator elected...but, ironically, he can’t, because if he ever promoted his own history, he would be rejected by his own Party...as a “dagblessid terr-ir-ist”...which would mean that the guy who once told John McCain to exploit a terrorist connection...might well be outed as one by McCain’s former running mate.
Which, my friends, is some pretty deep irony.
King, a Congressman who represents a district that straddles New York’s Long Island (NY-3), previously served as the Comptroller of Nassau County and a member of Hempstead, New York’s Town Council, which wouldn’t seem to be the kind of résumé that would give you much credibility in this arena—but Mr. King is a special case.
You see, Mr. King knows a great deal about terrorism...from the inside...because for many years the personal cause that drove his life was to be an active and public supporter of a terrorist group.
And that’s why, today, we’ll be connecting the dots between Congressman King and the Irish Republican Army.
“If this is a war on terrorism, then this person should not be treated as an ordinary criminal.”
--Peter King, on “Good Morning America”, January 6, 2010
When King says don’t treat them like an ordinary criminal, what he really means is that he supports a variety of interrogation methods for those who might be terrorists. In fact, in an interview with “Politico” last August King took offense to the very idea that Attorney General Holder would even investigate CIA interrogation practices:
"It’s bulls***. It’s disgraceful. You wonder which side they’re on..."
In the same interview King defended the practice of threatening the family of those being interrogated as well as the use of a power drill as a tool of coercion, both practices that qualify as torture under US law:
"Why is it OK to waterboard someone, which causes physical pain, but not threaten someone and not cause pain?"
He’s so fervent about stopping terrorism that, in a 2001 WABC interview, King even offered his support for the use of tactical nuclear weapons against terrorists.
And just the other day, he wondered why a terror suspect would even be allowed to fly at all.
With all due respect, Congressman...they allow you to fly, don’t they?
The (mostly Catholic) Irish Republican Army (and its political wing, Sinn Féin) has been seeking to unite Northern Ireland with the rest of Ireland for nearly a century. This has been challenged by the (mostly Protestant) Ulster Volunteer Force, who want to continue Northern Ireland’s status as a separate entity within the United Kingdom.
It is reported that the IRA killed more than 2000 people from 1972 to 2002 (in fact, they apologized for those killings); the British Army response includes the events that were the inspiration for the U2 song “Sunday Bloody Sunday”.
Among the most famous of the IRA’s terror attacks was a 1974 bombing targeting the House of Commons in London and the assassination of Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin, in 1979.
Americans have been among the victims of IRA bombings; the recently departed Bush Administration made a deal for compensation for some of those victims.
The IRA had a foreign policy, as well, including a relationship with Libya’s Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi that was well underway as early as 1973, involving, at a minimum, the illegal importation of weapons and Semtex explosive into Ireland.
Americans played a major part in the fundraising support for the IRA’s campaign of terror—and prominent among those Americans...was...wait for it...(not yet a Congressman) Peter King, who, ironically, had his telephone calls monitored due to his status as a terrorist sympathizer by the same intelligence establishment he now oversees in his Congressional capacity.
How sympathetic was King? Consider this comment, from a 1982 speech King gave at pro-IRA rally in Nassau County, New York:
"We must pledge ourselves to support those brave men and women who this very moment are carrying forth the struggle against British imperialism in the streets of Belfast and Derry."
(Now Congressman) King was on the dais for the 28th Annual Irish Northern Aid Testimonial Dinner in 1999 (NORAID being the IRA’s US fundraising arm). In 2005 the Bush Administration ordered such fundraising stopped; this because the IRA, in the Administration’s view, was still involved in criminal activity in Ireland.
According to Federal Election Commission records NORAID’s publicity director, attorney Martin Galvin, has only contributed to one Federal political campaign from 1979 to 2008—Peter King’s. This is the same Martin Galvin that reportedly supported the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, which was eventually designated by the US State Department as a “foreign terrorist organization”.
NORAID gave back to King as well. In 1985 they arranged for King to be named Grand Marshal of the St. Patrick’s Day Parade—which, in New York City, is about as big a deal as a politician could ever hope for.
King is also reported to have frequented a Belfast bar known as an IRA hangout, the Felons Club.
An Irish judge once refused to allow King to attend a trial for an IRA member because the judge felt King “...was an obvious collaborator with the IRA."
By the way, this is the same Peter King that once told John McCain he:
"...shouldn't shy away from raising the Ayers connection, to raise questions about Obama's judgment."
(Remember William Ayers? He’s the terrorist that Sarah Palin wanted everyone to know Obama was “palling around with” during the 2008 campaign.)
The American fundraising was driving the political leadership in the UK to fits, including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who, according to notes taken by her staff in 1979, felt that:
“The Americans must be made to realise that for so long as they continued to finance terrorism, they would be responsible for the deaths of US citizens as well as others...The Americans must be brought to face the consequences of their actions.”
So at this point I could end the story by yelling: “Hypocrite, hypocrite, big stinky-butt hypocrite!”...or by suggesting we get all Cheney on the guy and waterboard him to see what other IRA plots he may still be aware of...but the fact is, the picture is a lot more complex than what’s been presented up to this point.
There is reporting that suggests King was willing to meet with representatives of both Sinn Féin and the opposition Ulster Unionist movement, and that his efforts not only helped the Irish peace process, but came at considerable personal risk.
He was also closely associated with Bill Clinton’s efforts to promote peace in Ireland, an unusual partnership for a Republican Congressman and a serving Democratic President in the “modern era” of post-Watergate politics.
And it wasn’t just King—Teddy Kennedy, Alfonse D’Amato, and [insert the name of virtually any “downstate” New York politician here] were working the same rallies and knew some or all of the same people King knew—and were hoping to harvest from the same community of voters and donors and volunteers.
And that’s how we get to the great irony of today’s story:
There is one man in American Government who has literally “palled around” with terrorists—in their own bar, back home in Belfast—and he wasn’t content to just pal around with the terrorists, he went further and actually helped the terrorists fundraise on US soil...for years...despite the fact that the terrorists were also attacking Americans.
And if that wasn’t enough, he kicked it up a notch and palled around with two opposing groups of terrorists, and in doing so, actually made the world a better place.
And yet, in today’s Republiteabag Party Express© environment, when he might be able to apply some of that Irish experience to this conflict, he can’t...which is too bad, because if he did something big, bipartisan, and statesmanlike, right now, it might give him the best shot he’ll ever have at becoming a Senator...in a time when Republiteabaggers badly need a few seats.
In fact, if he was able to tell his own Party this story, it might be the best thing he could do to get more than one new Senator elected...but, ironically, he can’t, because if he ever promoted his own history, he would be rejected by his own Party...as a “dagblessid terr-ir-ist”...which would mean that the guy who once told John McCain to exploit a terrorist connection...might well be outed as one by McCain’s former running mate.
Which, my friends, is some pretty deep irony.
Sunday, March 2, 2008
On Baby Nukes, Or, Sometimes The Smallest Things Cause The Biggest Problems
We come before you today with another of those giant stories.
In fact, this one is so large that to make it a bit more digestible we’re going to break it down into smaller parts. Today’s, obviously, is part one.
The issues we’ll discuss will be an immediate concern of the next President, they impact upon our relationships with many of the world’s nations, and they directly affect whether we will return to a nuclear arms race with Russia…and even more fundamentally, whether we will be a nation that embraces the “first use” of nuclear weapons while asking others to give them up.
And with that, I bid you welcome to the mostly uncharted territory of “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”.
Because this is a particularly large story, I want to take a moment to offer you a preview of what’s to come: we will explain exactly what the weapons are we’re talking about, how they’re used, who has them…and of course, some history to orient our thinking, and an analysis of the potential futures to tie it all together.
(A quick author’s note: unless otherwise noted, the quotes used throughout the series are from the Congressional Research Service’s report “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”; which as of this writing is just over a month old.)
The first question you might be asking is: how exactly does this affect the next Administration?
So: just what exactly are nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and how are nuclear weapons used “tactically”?
In times past, the distinction was made through weapons design and capabilities—for example, long-range Russian ICBMs at one time were not accurate enough for tactical use; and there was no delivery system capable of launching short-range US nuclear artillery shells from Germany to Moscow.
This view seems to be no longer valid. For example, first generation Soviet submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) had a relatively short range of less than 500 miles, but were absolutely strategic weapons. By the same token, modern US Air Force or Navy cruise missiles that we normally use tactically can become strategic weapons if the targeting is changed.
In fact, the same Tomahawk cruise missiles that were launched from the sea into command and control targets in downtown Baghdad during the “shock and awe” campaign might have been used just as easily against Chinese naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait…and it may happen yet, if our defense establishment is to be believed.
A third way of defining “nonstrategic” weapons is by identifying them as those weapons that are not today covered by any other arms-control treaties or agreements.
While this third definition is the one we’ll be focused upon in these discussions (most of the time anyway); we should also keep in mind as we go along that the “strategic and tactical” definition of these weapons intertwines with our “not in a treaty” definition, and neither is mutually exclusive of the other.
Estimates suggest that by 1991 the Soviets possessed somewhere around 20,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, down from a peak of about 25,000. It is estimated the US possessed a number nearer to 7,000. These numbers had been trending down throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s as both sides modernized weapons systems and ratified various arms-control pacts.
What types of weapons are we talking about?
With the exception of suitcase bombs (as far as we know) the US deployed the same types of weapons in Europe and Asia.
Both sides required so many nonstrategic weapons, particularly in the European theater, because Soviet doctrine envisioned surprise tactical nuclear attacks on NATO positions followed by masses of armor and infantry as the beginning of a Western European invasion (picture the process of “walking” artillery into an enemy encampment with your ground forces close behind the explosions and you have the idea on a smaller scale)…and NATO doctrine saw them as a tool to delay or stop such an invasion.
It is worth noting that for NATO these weapons also serve a political purpose. There are today weapons in storage sites located on bases in several of the NATO countries. Agreement among the NATO members seems to be required before they would be used…but beyond that, the presence of these weapons on European soil means even if the US chose not to respond to an aggression against a NATO ally, that ally could. This creates a certainty of deterrence that is believed to benefit the alliance in ways that extend beyond the weapons’ direct military utility.
By the 1980s, Soviet leaders had come to the conclusion that any tactical use of nuclear weapons against the US or NATO would lead to a “full exchange” of weapons, which would be…well, Mutually Assured Destruction.
In 1991, the United States began unilaterally reducing not just the inventory of warheads, but more importantly, nonstrategic nuclear weapons’ delivery systems. Nuclear anti-aircraft systems and the “atomic cannon” were among the decedents.
Current public disclosure reports only US attack submarines and aircraft can deliver such weapons.
It is reported that about 1100 of these weapons currently remain in the US arsenal. About 500 of the weapons are believed to be bombs which are stored in the NATO countries. About 320 sea-launched cruise missiles are believed to be stored in facilities in the US. The remainders are believed to be bombs, also stored on US territory.
The US, at the direction of the smarter President Bush, began to destroy the warheads from these weapons. The work continues to this day at the Pantex Plant in Texas (An example of how fast progress is made? The last W-79 nuclear artillery shell was destroyed in 2003). Due to the volume of backlogged work and the inability to increase processing capacity, job security at Pantex seems to be assured for some number of years to come.
Concurrent with the US reductions, the Soviet Union and later Russia also unilaterally reduced the number of their deployed weapons…but they do not appear to be dismantling all the warheads (despite earlier promises to do so), choosing instead to store them; either for future use or to be dismantled when more funding becomes available for such efforts.
For a number of years the Russian Federation has also been destroying strategic warheads (consistent with other treaty obligations); and in addition to the factors discussed above capacity restraints might account for the decision not to destroy the nonstrategic warheads.
Additionally, the Russians have recently made public statements that they need to store the warheads because they are concerned about US efforts to develop new generations of warheads.
Another reason the question of future use is being raised is because Russia, in contrast to our position at the time, chose to continue to consider the use-including first use-of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to be important part of their military doctrine.
From the CRS report:
To understand the second paragraph of that quote completely, see: Chechnya, Inability to End Insurgency Using Conventional Forces…and then read the faux book “Russia Doesn’t Need Another Afghanistan, Thank You”.
There seems to be a low probability that Russia will resume a conventional military buildup sufficient to allow the nation’s military to reduce its reliance on “substrategic” nukes (the term favored by the United Nations’ WMD Commission) if only because of the unbelievable cost involved.
The US is looking at the better part of $800 billion, by my estimation, to “re-up” our military rolling stock and aircraft after the current Iraq adventure—and that does not include the cost of payroll for the soldiers to operate the new equipment…a cost we bear today, but the Russians do not.
There is no evidence that the kind of money required for such a buildup is even available to the Russian Federation—and as the Soviets discovered, the public will eventually demand butter over guns if they discover butter.
And today, Russian citizens know about butter.
That said, there were other reasons for the Russian decision to continue to rely on “battlefield nukes”. Examples include the concerns regarding NATO expansion and the inability to influence the NATO military actions against the Serbs in Kosovo; both of which also appear to have factored into the mix to one degree or another.
It is speculated that Russia may today have the ability to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons from aircraft, ships at sea, and in the form of air-defense missiles. There may also be weapons deployable by ground forces.
The concerns were as much about countries to the south (Iran, Pakistan, and maybe Iraq, we are told) as the US—and the ten years since then have made that assessment more relevant than ever.
These matters have become more noteworthy since Russia threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in the first half of 2007.
Let’s take a moment to reconsider where we’ve been so far:
There are certain nuclear weapons that once could be classified by their targeting, or their size, or their range, as “non strategic” or “substrategic” nuclear weapons.
Today we recognize them as those weapons not included in other arms-control regimes. We also now realize that many weapons could conceivably be strategic or nonstrategic depending on how the device is targeted.
Both the US and the Russian Federation are unilaterally decreasing the numbers of weapons in this class that are deployed, but there are issues related to the destruction of the warheads associated with those weapons and their possible future use.
Russian military doctrine continues to envision the first use of nuclear weapons against some targets…and as concerns over Islamist-inspired terrorism and its impact on the Russian state increase; the probability of their actual use does as well.
That probability is further increased when you realize that Russian Federation conventional forces are not today likely to be able to mount an expeditionary campaign similar to our own Iraq/Afghanistan campaigns, should they be the victims of a “9/11” style attack.
That’s plenty to digest for today…and for next time: the evolution of US doctrine regarding the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the changing cast of potential characters, and the challenges we face going forward as those first two topics interact.
In fact, this one is so large that to make it a bit more digestible we’re going to break it down into smaller parts. Today’s, obviously, is part one.
The issues we’ll discuss will be an immediate concern of the next President, they impact upon our relationships with many of the world’s nations, and they directly affect whether we will return to a nuclear arms race with Russia…and even more fundamentally, whether we will be a nation that embraces the “first use” of nuclear weapons while asking others to give them up.
And with that, I bid you welcome to the mostly uncharted territory of “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”.
Because this is a particularly large story, I want to take a moment to offer you a preview of what’s to come: we will explain exactly what the weapons are we’re talking about, how they’re used, who has them…and of course, some history to orient our thinking, and an analysis of the potential futures to tie it all together.
(A quick author’s note: unless otherwise noted, the quotes used throughout the series are from the Congressional Research Service’s report “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”; which as of this writing is just over a month old.)
The first question you might be asking is: how exactly does this affect the next Administration?
Congress has also required that the next Administration conduct a new review of U.S. nuclear weapons posture and programs in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 110-477).
So: just what exactly are nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and how are nuclear weapons used “tactically”?
According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, a strategic mission is:
Directed against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity and will to make war. Targets include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, and other such target systems.
As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces.
In contrast, the tactical use of nuclear weapons is defined as “the use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in support of the military commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military operations.”
In times past, the distinction was made through weapons design and capabilities—for example, long-range Russian ICBMs at one time were not accurate enough for tactical use; and there was no delivery system capable of launching short-range US nuclear artillery shells from Germany to Moscow.
This view seems to be no longer valid. For example, first generation Soviet submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) had a relatively short range of less than 500 miles, but were absolutely strategic weapons. By the same token, modern US Air Force or Navy cruise missiles that we normally use tactically can become strategic weapons if the targeting is changed.
In fact, the same Tomahawk cruise missiles that were launched from the sea into command and control targets in downtown Baghdad during the “shock and awe” campaign might have been used just as easily against Chinese naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait…and it may happen yet, if our defense establishment is to be believed.
A third way of defining “nonstrategic” weapons is by identifying them as those weapons that are not today covered by any other arms-control treaties or agreements.
While this third definition is the one we’ll be focused upon in these discussions (most of the time anyway); we should also keep in mind as we go along that the “strategic and tactical” definition of these weapons intertwines with our “not in a treaty” definition, and neither is mutually exclusive of the other.
Estimates suggest that by 1991 the Soviets possessed somewhere around 20,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, down from a peak of about 25,000. It is estimated the US possessed a number nearer to 7,000. These numbers had been trending down throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s as both sides modernized weapons systems and ratified various arms-control pacts.
What types of weapons are we talking about?
At different times during the period, [the Soviet Union] deployed “suitcase bombs,” nuclear mines, shells for artillery, short-, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles, short-range air-delivered missiles, and gravity bombs.
With the exception of suitcase bombs (as far as we know) the US deployed the same types of weapons in Europe and Asia.
Both sides required so many nonstrategic weapons, particularly in the European theater, because Soviet doctrine envisioned surprise tactical nuclear attacks on NATO positions followed by masses of armor and infantry as the beginning of a Western European invasion (picture the process of “walking” artillery into an enemy encampment with your ground forces close behind the explosions and you have the idea on a smaller scale)…and NATO doctrine saw them as a tool to delay or stop such an invasion.
It is worth noting that for NATO these weapons also serve a political purpose. There are today weapons in storage sites located on bases in several of the NATO countries. Agreement among the NATO members seems to be required before they would be used…but beyond that, the presence of these weapons on European soil means even if the US chose not to respond to an aggression against a NATO ally, that ally could. This creates a certainty of deterrence that is believed to benefit the alliance in ways that extend beyond the weapons’ direct military utility.
By the 1980s, Soviet leaders had come to the conclusion that any tactical use of nuclear weapons against the US or NATO would lead to a “full exchange” of weapons, which would be…well, Mutually Assured Destruction.
In 1991, the United States began unilaterally reducing not just the inventory of warheads, but more importantly, nonstrategic nuclear weapons’ delivery systems. Nuclear anti-aircraft systems and the “atomic cannon” were among the decedents.
Current public disclosure reports only US attack submarines and aircraft can deliver such weapons.
It is reported that about 1100 of these weapons currently remain in the US arsenal. About 500 of the weapons are believed to be bombs which are stored in the NATO countries. About 320 sea-launched cruise missiles are believed to be stored in facilities in the US. The remainders are believed to be bombs, also stored on US territory.
The US, at the direction of the smarter President Bush, began to destroy the warheads from these weapons. The work continues to this day at the Pantex Plant in Texas (An example of how fast progress is made? The last W-79 nuclear artillery shell was destroyed in 2003). Due to the volume of backlogged work and the inability to increase processing capacity, job security at Pantex seems to be assured for some number of years to come.
Concurrent with the US reductions, the Soviet Union and later Russia also unilaterally reduced the number of their deployed weapons…but they do not appear to be dismantling all the warheads (despite earlier promises to do so), choosing instead to store them; either for future use or to be dismantled when more funding becomes available for such efforts.
For a number of years the Russian Federation has also been destroying strategic warheads (consistent with other treaty obligations); and in addition to the factors discussed above capacity restraints might account for the decision not to destroy the nonstrategic warheads.
Additionally, the Russians have recently made public statements that they need to store the warheads because they are concerned about US efforts to develop new generations of warheads.
Another reason the question of future use is being raised is because Russia, in contrast to our position at the time, chose to continue to consider the use-including first use-of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to be important part of their military doctrine.
From the CRS report:
Russia revised its national security and military strategy several times during the 1990s, with each successive version appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. For example, the military doctrine issued in 1997 allowed for the use of nuclear weapons “…in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation.”
The doctrine published in 2000 expanded the circumstances when Russia might use nuclear weapons to include attacks using weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies “as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.”
To understand the second paragraph of that quote completely, see: Chechnya, Inability to End Insurgency Using Conventional Forces…and then read the faux book “Russia Doesn’t Need Another Afghanistan, Thank You”.
There seems to be a low probability that Russia will resume a conventional military buildup sufficient to allow the nation’s military to reduce its reliance on “substrategic” nukes (the term favored by the United Nations’ WMD Commission) if only because of the unbelievable cost involved.
The US is looking at the better part of $800 billion, by my estimation, to “re-up” our military rolling stock and aircraft after the current Iraq adventure—and that does not include the cost of payroll for the soldiers to operate the new equipment…a cost we bear today, but the Russians do not.
There is no evidence that the kind of money required for such a buildup is even available to the Russian Federation—and as the Soviets discovered, the public will eventually demand butter over guns if they discover butter.
And today, Russian citizens know about butter.
That said, there were other reasons for the Russian decision to continue to rely on “battlefield nukes”. Examples include the concerns regarding NATO expansion and the inability to influence the NATO military actions against the Serbs in Kosovo; both of which also appear to have factored into the mix to one degree or another.
It is speculated that Russia may today have the ability to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons from aircraft, ships at sea, and in the form of air-defense missiles. There may also be weapons deployable by ground forces.
One Russian analyst has speculated that the [military planning] documents approved in 1999 focused on the development of operations plans that would allow Russia to conduct “limited nuclear war with strategic means in order to deter the enemy, requiring the infliction of preplanned, but limited damage.”
The concerns were as much about countries to the south (Iran, Pakistan, and maybe Iraq, we are told) as the US—and the ten years since then have made that assessment more relevant than ever.
These matters have become more noteworthy since Russia threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in the first half of 2007.
Let’s take a moment to reconsider where we’ve been so far:
There are certain nuclear weapons that once could be classified by their targeting, or their size, or their range, as “non strategic” or “substrategic” nuclear weapons.
Today we recognize them as those weapons not included in other arms-control regimes. We also now realize that many weapons could conceivably be strategic or nonstrategic depending on how the device is targeted.
Both the US and the Russian Federation are unilaterally decreasing the numbers of weapons in this class that are deployed, but there are issues related to the destruction of the warheads associated with those weapons and their possible future use.
Russian military doctrine continues to envision the first use of nuclear weapons against some targets…and as concerns over Islamist-inspired terrorism and its impact on the Russian state increase; the probability of their actual use does as well.
That probability is further increased when you realize that Russian Federation conventional forces are not today likely to be able to mount an expeditionary campaign similar to our own Iraq/Afghanistan campaigns, should they be the victims of a “9/11” style attack.
That’s plenty to digest for today…and for next time: the evolution of US doctrine regarding the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the changing cast of potential characters, and the challenges we face going forward as those first two topics interact.
Thursday, January 25, 2007
On Not Losing, Or, Pull Out Now-To Afghanistan
In a previous discussion I created a hypothetical set 3 months in the future, and asked the community how we might respond.
Today I’d like to do something similar, but with a predetermined outcome.
But before I do, let’s talk about that outcome.
There are a bunch of reasons to remain engaged in the Mideast neighborhood, and a bunch of reasons not to be in Iraq.
For those still evaluating the issues, consider the following:
Precipitous withdrawal will create a power vacuum, and there will be a fight-unless the Sunni decide to accept what appears to be a future of poverty and no political power.
Of course, al-Sadr will also have to accept being at the bottom of the economic pile while bearing no animosity to the wealthy Shi’a keeping him there, and all Shi’a will have to accept that 35 years of mistreatment from the Sunni deserve no retaliation.
What about the Kurds?
Iran?
Saudi Arabia?
Do you own that much Tylenol?
If we race home, our image as a reliable partner will once again be tarnished, although, ironically, our perception as an “honest broker” might actually improve, if we were not seen as providing backing for one faction or another.
In the meantime, spring draws ever nearer, which means trouble ahead in Afghanistan. Fighters coming down from the Northeast mountain provinces and Pakistan will create more trouble for the multinational force in country.
What might happen in a withdrawal scenario? Most likely is the pullback of US forces to bases in Iraq, and a basically defensive posture. At the same time, some (half?) of US forces will likely withdraw back home, particularly National Guard units.
Of course, this won’t last long (the best fortress is a prison theory, and who wants to sit around taking inbound mortars?), suggesting that this solution will also lead us right back where we are now, US troops trying to put out fires as they break out, especially in Baghdad.
So how can we create the appearance of impartiality and strength, stay militarily engaged, and deal with the coming Afghani spring offensive?
I suggest, instead of withdrawing to defensive positions in Iraq, we withdraw to offensive positions in Afghanistan, while maintaining a backup force to discourage outside intervention.
Pitfalls?
You bet.
All this will only work if we can...
...Convince the surrounding nations that stability in Iraq serves everybody’s best interests, and…
…Convince the population of Iraq that stability in Iraq serves everybody’s best interests.
Neither one an easy proposition.
Diplomatic efforts must begin immediately and must be perceived as militarily neutral, as opposed to militarily offensive.
There should be four objectives: to convince Iran not to involve themselves internally (bribery is an option here), to assure the Kurds that we will allow them to defend their interests as needed, to find a way to create economic opportunity amongst the al-Sadr supporters, and to reassure Sunni Islam that Iraqi Sunnis will not be marginalized, if we can help it.
Possible positive outcomes?
Here’s a few:
Diplomacy creates an interest in Iran in a more expansive economic relationship, which helps us maintain parity with China in securing access to traditional energy resources over the next few decades.
Why would Iran be interested? Because they have a younger generation, too, and a future of war and sanctions will not give them much to do, creating internal instability the Iranian Government would probably rather avoid.
A similar analysis could be made regarding Syria.
The Royal Saudi Government has much to gain from stability, and even more to gain from the perception that the US is not an enemy of the Sunni.
Our allies in Afghanistan get assistance they could really use, at the most active time of the combat year, if recent history repeats itself.
All of this reinforces the perception that the US does have the patience to stay around for the long haul.
It also leaves the factions in Iraq having to decide how to reconcile without us taking sides in daily combat-unless all sides choose all-out warfare, which we may not be able to contain under any conditions, including the status quo.
So that’s my conversation about what to do.
Now here’s my question-how do we do it?
Specifically, where can we start moving troops, and to whom should we reach out to first diplomatically?
Today I’d like to do something similar, but with a predetermined outcome.
But before I do, let’s talk about that outcome.
There are a bunch of reasons to remain engaged in the Mideast neighborhood, and a bunch of reasons not to be in Iraq.
For those still evaluating the issues, consider the following:
Precipitous withdrawal will create a power vacuum, and there will be a fight-unless the Sunni decide to accept what appears to be a future of poverty and no political power.
Of course, al-Sadr will also have to accept being at the bottom of the economic pile while bearing no animosity to the wealthy Shi’a keeping him there, and all Shi’a will have to accept that 35 years of mistreatment from the Sunni deserve no retaliation.
What about the Kurds?
Iran?
Saudi Arabia?
Do you own that much Tylenol?
If we race home, our image as a reliable partner will once again be tarnished, although, ironically, our perception as an “honest broker” might actually improve, if we were not seen as providing backing for one faction or another.
In the meantime, spring draws ever nearer, which means trouble ahead in Afghanistan. Fighters coming down from the Northeast mountain provinces and Pakistan will create more trouble for the multinational force in country.
What might happen in a withdrawal scenario? Most likely is the pullback of US forces to bases in Iraq, and a basically defensive posture. At the same time, some (half?) of US forces will likely withdraw back home, particularly National Guard units.
Of course, this won’t last long (the best fortress is a prison theory, and who wants to sit around taking inbound mortars?), suggesting that this solution will also lead us right back where we are now, US troops trying to put out fires as they break out, especially in Baghdad.
So how can we create the appearance of impartiality and strength, stay militarily engaged, and deal with the coming Afghani spring offensive?
I suggest, instead of withdrawing to defensive positions in Iraq, we withdraw to offensive positions in Afghanistan, while maintaining a backup force to discourage outside intervention.
Pitfalls?
You bet.
All this will only work if we can...
...Convince the surrounding nations that stability in Iraq serves everybody’s best interests, and…
…Convince the population of Iraq that stability in Iraq serves everybody’s best interests.
Neither one an easy proposition.
Diplomatic efforts must begin immediately and must be perceived as militarily neutral, as opposed to militarily offensive.
There should be four objectives: to convince Iran not to involve themselves internally (bribery is an option here), to assure the Kurds that we will allow them to defend their interests as needed, to find a way to create economic opportunity amongst the al-Sadr supporters, and to reassure Sunni Islam that Iraqi Sunnis will not be marginalized, if we can help it.
Possible positive outcomes?
Here’s a few:
Diplomacy creates an interest in Iran in a more expansive economic relationship, which helps us maintain parity with China in securing access to traditional energy resources over the next few decades.
Why would Iran be interested? Because they have a younger generation, too, and a future of war and sanctions will not give them much to do, creating internal instability the Iranian Government would probably rather avoid.
A similar analysis could be made regarding Syria.
The Royal Saudi Government has much to gain from stability, and even more to gain from the perception that the US is not an enemy of the Sunni.
Our allies in Afghanistan get assistance they could really use, at the most active time of the combat year, if recent history repeats itself.
All of this reinforces the perception that the US does have the patience to stay around for the long haul.
It also leaves the factions in Iraq having to decide how to reconcile without us taking sides in daily combat-unless all sides choose all-out warfare, which we may not be able to contain under any conditions, including the status quo.
So that’s my conversation about what to do.
Now here’s my question-how do we do it?
Specifically, where can we start moving troops, and to whom should we reach out to first diplomatically?
Saturday, January 20, 2007
On Chess, Or, “The Surge Is Underway: What Now?”
I’m not so good at chess.
I’ve noticed, however, that a near universal rule of chess is…
…The farther you can look ahead, the better chance you have of success.
With that in mind, I’d like to create a hypothetical, and see if there might be ideas that can be gathered from the community, put them together, and develop a sort of “Iraq Repair Plan”.
So here goes.
Let’s go forward in time about 3 or 4 months.
Most, if not all, of 20, 000 “surge” troops are in country, and they have received assignments.
They are primarily Army Infantry and Marine combat troops.
As of now there is an additional $1.5 billion for economic assistance available.
If I understand the President’s plan, Iraqi Army troops (mostly Shi’a) will arrive to “de-militia” Sadr City (also mostly Shi’a).
The exact number of these militia troops, and their level of armament, is unknown; but the probability that the number is above 50, 000 is fairly high.
This disarming will occur while US forces are on station acting as an exclusion force keeping Sunni forces out of the Iraqi Army’s area of influence.
If this does not go according to plan, the most likely weak points are:
1) Insufficient Iraqi Army troops arrive.
2) They arrive unwilling to fight.
3) US troops are unable to exclude Sunni forces/individual operators.
4) The two Shi’a forces unite to drive Sunni from Baghdad.
Now here are my hypothetical conditions…
…At this point in the operation:
About two-thirds of the expected Iraqi Army forces have arrived.
Some of these forces (<10%)>
About 75% of US ground forces are on station, 25% in reserve.
Militia troops number 50, 000 and, like Iraqi Army troops, the probability is high that most of these militia forces are lightly armed.
The militia troops have access to RPGs, IEDs, and mortars.
Only US forces in Baghdad have access to substantial armor.
Sufficient helicopter and fixed wing ground support aircraft are available, along with helicopter transport.
There are no known (or, to paraphrase Rumsfeld) likely unknown opposition air forces; however, Stinger-like weapons are possible.
US troops are fairly effective in excluding Sunni ground forces.
Sunni mortar attacks, however, cause US forces to use “whack-a-mole” tactics for suppression, with some collateral effect on the local Sunni population.
Al-Sadr did not voluntarily disarm, and resists with violence.
As a result, a relatively small portion of the IA forces and their weapons (<5%)>
Another portion of the force chose not to engage during battle (15%), and instead faded from the area.
There are substantial Iraqi Army casualties from the combat operations (10%)
US casualties are below 50 killed for the operation so far.
The collateral effect on Shi’a civilians in the immediate combat areas is on the order of the Fallujah operation.
At this point in my scenario, the Iraqi Army appears unable, by military means, to disarm Al-Sadr.
No non-military means have been advanced beyond the appeal to Al-Sadr’s interest in a unified Iraq and his current bloc in the Iraqi Parliament.
The community is the commanding general.
What’s our best move?
I’ve noticed, however, that a near universal rule of chess is…
…The farther you can look ahead, the better chance you have of success.
With that in mind, I’d like to create a hypothetical, and see if there might be ideas that can be gathered from the community, put them together, and develop a sort of “Iraq Repair Plan”.
So here goes.
Let’s go forward in time about 3 or 4 months.
Most, if not all, of 20, 000 “surge” troops are in country, and they have received assignments.
They are primarily Army Infantry and Marine combat troops.
As of now there is an additional $1.5 billion for economic assistance available.
If I understand the President’s plan, Iraqi Army troops (mostly Shi’a) will arrive to “de-militia” Sadr City (also mostly Shi’a).
The exact number of these militia troops, and their level of armament, is unknown; but the probability that the number is above 50, 000 is fairly high.
This disarming will occur while US forces are on station acting as an exclusion force keeping Sunni forces out of the Iraqi Army’s area of influence.
If this does not go according to plan, the most likely weak points are:
1) Insufficient Iraqi Army troops arrive.
2) They arrive unwilling to fight.
3) US troops are unable to exclude Sunni forces/individual operators.
4) The two Shi’a forces unite to drive Sunni from Baghdad.
Now here are my hypothetical conditions…
…At this point in the operation:
About two-thirds of the expected Iraqi Army forces have arrived.
Some of these forces (<10%)>
About 75% of US ground forces are on station, 25% in reserve.
Militia troops number 50, 000 and, like Iraqi Army troops, the probability is high that most of these militia forces are lightly armed.
The militia troops have access to RPGs, IEDs, and mortars.
Only US forces in Baghdad have access to substantial armor.
Sufficient helicopter and fixed wing ground support aircraft are available, along with helicopter transport.
There are no known (or, to paraphrase Rumsfeld) likely unknown opposition air forces; however, Stinger-like weapons are possible.
US troops are fairly effective in excluding Sunni ground forces.
Sunni mortar attacks, however, cause US forces to use “whack-a-mole” tactics for suppression, with some collateral effect on the local Sunni population.
Al-Sadr did not voluntarily disarm, and resists with violence.
As a result, a relatively small portion of the IA forces and their weapons (<5%)>
Another portion of the force chose not to engage during battle (15%), and instead faded from the area.
There are substantial Iraqi Army casualties from the combat operations (10%)
US casualties are below 50 killed for the operation so far.
The collateral effect on Shi’a civilians in the immediate combat areas is on the order of the Fallujah operation.
At this point in my scenario, the Iraqi Army appears unable, by military means, to disarm Al-Sadr.
No non-military means have been advanced beyond the appeal to Al-Sadr’s interest in a unified Iraq and his current bloc in the Iraqi Parliament.
The community is the commanding general.
What’s our best move?
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